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NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS 
BOARD V. MURPHY OIL USA, INC.: 
A TEST OF MIGHT 
ELIZABETH STOREY* 
INTRODUCTION 
National Labor Relations Board v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc.1 presents 
a conflict between two long-standing federal statutes in the context of 
employment contracts.2 The class action waivers at issue in this case 
involve arbitration agreements in which employees waive any right to 
collective action over legal disputes with their employers in any 
forum. The National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (“NLRA”) and the 
Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 (“FAA”), each with its own set of 
underlying interests, have come head to head. Foreclosing the option 
of collective action offends the former, while failure to enforce an 
arbitration agreement undermines the latter. The Supreme Court is no 
stranger to challenges against the FAA. It has yet, however, to decide 
a case in which enforcing the FAA might risk directly violating an 
equally powerful federal law. As each side contemplates the conflicts, 
compatibility, and potential inapplicability of the statutes in relation 
to the waivers at issue, the Supreme Court faces a question of policy. 
Its decision will likely depend on whether it applies one of the two 
exceptions available to the mandate on arbitration enforcement. But 
the Court must recognize the policy concerns at stake. Ultimately, 
ruling against the employees’ interests risks a greater harm to them 
than against Respondents’ interest in maintaining strong arbitration 
rights in this particular context. 
 
Copyright © 2017 Elizabeth Storey. 
* J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, Class of 2019. 
 1.  N.L.R.B. v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 809 (Jan. 13, 2017) (No. 16-307). 
 2.  Three separate matters have been consolidated into this case: (1) Murphy Oil USA, 
Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015); (2) Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147 (7th 
Cir. 2016); and (3) Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016). This 
commentary focuses only on the primary matter, Murphy Oil, in the interest of clarity. 
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I. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In November 2008, Sheila Hobson signed an arbitration 
agreement in connection with her application to work at a Murphy 
Oil gas station in Calera, Alabama.3 Murphy Oil USA, Inc., a national 
company, operates retail gas stations in 26 states.4 Murphy Oil 
required all applicants and current employees, like Hobson, to sign 
the binding arbitration agreement at issue in this case. 
By signing this contract, Hobson waived her right to pursue legal 
action over disputes relating to her employment in court, agreeing 
that any such claim would be brought in an arbitral forum.5 The 
contract specified that the disputes might involve violations of state or 
federal statutes, including alleged violations of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act (“FLSA”).6 Hobson also waived her right to collective 
action by signing the contract, which mandated that any claim be 
pursued individually: “Individual and the Company waive their right 
to commence, be a party to, or [act as a] class member [in, any class] 
or collective action . . . against the other party relating to employment 
issues . . . in arbitration or any other forum.”7 As such, she would not 
be permitted to consolidate any claims or join in an action with 
another employee.8 The arbitration provision concluded: 
“INDIVIDUAL AND COMPANY UNDERSTAND THAT, 
ABSENT THIS AGREEMENT, THEY WOULD HAVE THE 
RIGHT TO SUE EACH OTHER IN COURT, TO INITIATE OR 
BE A PARTY TO A GROUP OR CLASS CLAIM.”9 
Hobson worked at the Murphy Oil gas station from November 
2008 until September 2010.10 In June 2010, Hobson, with three other 
Murphy Oil employees, filed a collective action suit against the 
company in the United States District Court for the Northern District 
 
 3.  Murphy Oil, 808 F.3d at 1015. 
 4.  Brief for Respondent at 4, N.L.R.B. v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 809 (June 9, 
2017) (No. 16-307), 2017 WL 2591012, at *4 [hereinafter Brief for Respondent]. 
 5.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, N.L.R.B. v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 809 
(No. 16-307), 2016 WL 4761717, at *3 [hereinafter Petition for Writ of Certiorari] (“Excluding 
claims which must, by statute or other law, be resolved in other forums, Company and 
Individual agree to resolve any and all disputes . . . which relate in any manner whatsoever as to 
Individual’s employment . . . by binding arbitration.”). 
 6.  Id. at app. 25a. 
 7.  Id. at app. 25a–26a. 
 8.  Id. at app. 25a (“The parties agree that any claim by or against Individual or the 
Company shall be heard without consolidation of such claim with any other person or entity’s 
claim.”). 
 9.  Id. at app. 25a–26a.  
 10.  Id. at app. 26a. 
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of Alabama.11 Their complaint alleged that, in violation of the FLSA, 
the company failed to compensate the employees for overtime and 
other work-related activities.12 
In July 2010, Murphy Oil filed a motion to compel the plaintiff-
employees to submit their claims separately in individual arbitration 
actions, pursuant to each arbitration agreement the plaintiffs signed, 
and to dismiss the suit altogether.13 The plaintiff-employees opposed 
the motion, arguing that the FLSA protected their substantive right to 
collective action, thus making their signed arbitration agreements 
unenforceable.14 They also argued that enforcement of the arbitration 
agreements would interfere with their right to engage in concerted 
activity, protected by § 715 of the National Labor Relations Act 
(“NLRA”).16 
In January 2011, while the defendant-employers’ motion was 
pending, Hobson filed an unfair labor practice claim with the National 
Labor Relations Board (the “Board”).17 Hobson’s complaint with the 
Board alleged that Murphy Oil had violated § 8(a)(1) of the NLRA 
by “maintaining and enforcing a mandatory arbitration agreement 
that prohibits employees from engaging in protected, concerted 
activities.”18 The Board postponed a hearing on the complaint while it 
considered another similar action.19 
In January 2012, as Hobson’s hearing was pending, the Board 
issued an opinion in a separate action that would be determinative in 
 
 11.  Id.  
 12.  Id. at app. 27a; Fair Labor Standards Act of 1939, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060, 1060 (codified 
at 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012)). 
 13.  Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 808 F.3d 1013, 1015 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 14.  Id.  
 15.  The relevant briefs and opinions in this case refer to the various provisions in the 
NLRA interchangeably as sections codified in the individual act and the United States Code. 
So, “§ 7” also refers to 29 U.S.C. § 157. This Commentary will also refer to these sections 
interchangeably. 
 16.  National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, 157 (2012); Murphy Oil, 808 F.3d at 
1015–16.  
 17.  See Murphy Oil, 808 F.3d at 1016. See also 29 U.S.C §§ 153, 160 (discussing the powers 
and review procedure of the Board, and procedure for employees to file charges). 
 18.  Petition for Writ Certiorari, supra note 5, at app. 27a. Hobson’s complaint with the 
NLRB also alleged that the arbitration agreement’s language “would lead employees 
reasonably to believe that they were prohibited from filing unfair labor practice charges with the 
Board.” The Fifth Circuit addressed this allegation in its opinion, ruling that a revised version of 
the language was not problematic. Murphy Oil, 808 F.3d at 1020. That issue and analysis will not 
be addressed further in this Commentary.  
 19.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 5, at app. 27a.  
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Hobson’s complaint.20 In its D.R. Horton decision, the Board held that 
an employer violates the NLRA by requiring employees to waive 
their right to pursue class and collective claims, and mandating 
individual arbitration.21 These arbitration agreements restrict 
employees’ rights to engage in protected concerted activity.22 D.R. 
Horton appealed that decision in the Fifth Circuit.23 In December 
2013, the Fifth Circuit rejected the Board’s decision as it related to 
waivers of collection action in arbitration agreements, holding that 
those agreements do not violate any substantive right in the NLRA.24 
In September 2012, an Alabama district court granted the 
defendant-employers’ motion to compel, requiring that the plaintiff-
employees submit their claims to arbitration, pursuant to their 
employment agreements.25 The plaintiff-employees did not comply, 
and the defendant-employers refused to arbitrate their claims on a 
collective basis.26 Eventually, the plaintiff-employees moved for 
reconsideration of the order compelling arbitration, which the district 
court denied with prejudice.27 
In October 2014, the Board ruled in favor of Hobson, reaffirming 
its own D.R. Horton decision and disregarding the Fifth Circuit’s D.R. 
Horton opinion.28 The Board held that by “requiring its employees to 
agree to resolve all employment-related claims through individual 
arbitration, and by taking steps to enforce the unlawful agreements in 
the federal district court,” Murphy Oil violated § 8(a)(1).29 Murphy 
Oil filed a timely appeal in the Fifth Circuit to review the Board’s 
 
 20.  See Murphy Oil, 808 F.3d at 1016.  
 21.  Id. (citing In re D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, 2012 WL 36274 (Jan. 3, 
2012)). 
 22.  Id.; see N.L.R.B. v. City Disposal Sys. Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 841 (1984) (the NLRB 
“recognizes as concerted activity an individual employee’s reasonable and honest invocation of 
a right provided for in his collective-bargaining agreement” or other activity in pursuit of the 
rights provided for in the NRLA). 
 23.  D.R. Horton, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 737 F.3d 344, 348 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 24.  See id.  
 25.  Murphy Oil, 808 F.3d at 1016.  
 26.  Id. at 1016 n.1.  
 27.  Id. (citing Hobson v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., No. CV-10-S-1486, 2015 WL 4111661, at 
*3 (N.D. Ala. July 8, 2015)). The plaintiff-employees filed an appeal, which is pending before 
the Eleventh Circuit. 
 28.  Murphy Oil, 808 F.3d at 1017. The Board prescribed several remedies to correct the 
violations, including: revising or rescinding the arbitration agreement; posting a notice of their 
violations at the Murphy Oil facilities; and reimbursing the plaintiff-employees for the 
attorneys’ fees incurred in opposing the defendant-employers motion in the Alabama district 
court, among other actions. 
 29.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 5, at 8. 
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decision in Hobson’s case.30 After the Fifth Circuit reversed the 
Board’s Hobson decision, the Board filed a writ of certiorari with the 
Supreme Court to review the Fifth Circuit’s judgment.31 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The questions presented in Murphy Oil implicate a variety of 
statutes, precedents, and institutional bodies that either directly or 
indirectly regulate employment contracts.32 As such, it is helpful to 
take each in turn to understand how they have come to a head in this 
case. 
A. The National Labor Relations Act and the National Labor 
Relations Board 
The National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (“NLRA”), codified in 
29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169, was enacted to protect “the exercise by workers 
of full freedom of association . . . for the purpose of negotiating the 
terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or 
protection.”33 Under § 157, employees are granted the right “to self-
organization . . . and to engage in other concerted activities for the 
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”34 
To enforce, monitor, and provide relief for violations of the 
NLRA, Congress created the National Labor Relations Board as an 
agency of the United States, which “asserts a public right vested in it 
as a public body, charged in the public interest with the duty of 
preventing unfair labor practices.”35 Although the Board’s decisions 
are reviewable by the federal judiciary, 36 the Board has the power to 
 
 30.  Murphy Oil, 808 F.3d at 1017. 
 31.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 5, at 1.  
 32.  See generally id. 
 33.  29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012); Brief for Petitioner at 56, N.L.R.B. v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 
137 S. Ct. 809 (Aug. 9, 2017) (No. 16-307), 2017 WL 3447770, at *56 [hereinafter Brief for 
Petitioner]. 
 34.  29 U.S.C. § 157. 
 35.  Nat’l Licorice Co. v. N.L.R.B., 309 U.S. 350, 364 (1940). See also 29 U.S.C. § 151 
(stating that Congress established the National Labor Relations Board in an effort to relieve 
obstruction to the free flow of commerce by “encouraging the practice and procedure of 
collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, 
self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of 
negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection”). 
 36.  29 U.S.C. § 160(a). See also Eastex, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 437 U.S. 556, 568 (1978) (holding 
that the task of “attempt[ing] to delineate precisely the boundaries of the mutual aid or 
protection clause” is for the “Board to perform in the first instance”).  
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prevent persons from engaging in unfair labor practice, provided in § 
158.37 
Section 158 defines “unfair labor practices” to include the 
interference with, restraint, or coercion of “employees in the exercise 
of the rights guaranteed in § 157.”38 The Supreme Court has stated that 
§ 157 protects employees’ rights to “seek to improve working 
conditions through resort to administrative and judicial forums.”39 
Furthermore, in J.I. Case Co. v. N.L.R.B.,40 the Court recognized that 
“wherever private contracts conflict with” the functions of the NLRA, 
“they obviously must yield or the Act would be reduced to a 
futility.”41 Therefore, the NLRA jurisprudence demonstrates how the 
Supreme Court has shown its commitment to effectuating Congress’s 
strong interest in protecting employees’ collective action rights. 
B. The Federal Arbitration Act 
The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) provides that contractual 
provisions requiring disputes be settled by arbitration “shall be valid, 
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or 
inequity for the revocation of any contract.”42 Congress enacted the 
FAA in 1925 in an effort to place “private arbitration agreements 
upon the same footing as other contracts” by mandating judicial 
enforcement.43 There are two exceptions to this mandate: (1) the 
saving clause, and (2) the finding of a contrary congressional 
command. 
The saving clause, beginning “save upon . . . ,” allows arbitration 
agreements to be invalidated when contract law would normally 
invalidate an agreement, like in the case of fraud.44 An arbitration 
 
 37.  29 U.S.C. §§ 160(e)–(f). 
 38.  29 U.S.C. § 158 . 
 39.  Eastex, 437 U.S. at 565. 
 40.  321 U.S. 332 (1944) (holding that the collective bargaining agreement between a union 
and company properly superseded the series of individual contracts between the employees and 
the company based on the NLRA’s jurisdiction). 
 41.  Id. at 337.  
 42.  9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
 43.  Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25 (1991) (holding that a claim 
pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act was subject to compulsory arbitration 
as provided in a securities registration application and as required under the FAA). The Court 
noted that the petitioner was “bound by his agreement to arbitrate unless he [could] show an 
inherent conflict between arbitration and the ADEA’s underlying purposes.” Id. at 20. 
 44.  See Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421, 1426 (2017) (asserting 
that the FAA prevents any state law from outrightly prohibiting arbitration on its face or from 
“covertly accomplish[ing] the same objective by disfavoring contracts that (oh so coincidentally) 
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agreement is defined by its waiver of the right to seek relief in court 
and receive a jury trial.45 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has 
emphasized that the FAA’s protection of the right to an arbitral 
forum may not come at the expense of the substantive rights 
protected by the statute in the saving clause.46 If a challenge to the 
enforcement of an arbitration agreement does not fall under the 
saving clause, then a party opposed to arbitration must show “a 
contrary congressional command” to overcome the congressional 
policy favoring arbitration.47 Specifically, there must be evidence that 
“Congress intended to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the 
statutory rights at issue,” which may be discerned from that statute’s 
legislative history, text, or underlying purpose.48 
The FAA often preempts any conflicting state law on the grounds 
that federal policy strongly favors arbitration agreements, and its 
saving clause will not be construed to undermine the purpose of the 
FAA.49 In AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion (“Concepcion”), the 
Supreme Court held that the FAA preempted a California judicial 
rule that outlawed class arbitration waivers in consumer contracts 
because of unconscionability.50 The Court found that the FAA’s 
underlying policy interests heavily favored protecting the benefits of 
 
have the defining features of arbitration agreements”). 
 45.  See id. at 1427 (explaining that the Kentucky Supreme Court acted contrary to an 
outright AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion prohibition in adopting a legal rule that 
discriminated against the primary characteristic of an arbitration agreement: “a waiver of the 
right to go to court and receive a jury trial”). 
 46.  Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26. 
 47.  Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987) (holding that 
a court’s duty to rigorously enforce arbitration agreements is “not diminished when a party 
bound by an agreement raises a claim founded on statutory rights”). See also Mitsubishi Motors 
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627 (1985) (“Just as it is the congressional 
policy manifested in the [FAA] that requires courts liberally to construe the scope of arbitration 
agreements covered by that Act, it is the congressional intention expressed in some other 
statute on which the courts must rely to identify any category of claims as to which agreements 
to arbitrate will be held unenforceable.”) 
 48.  Shearson, 482 U.S. at 226–27.  
 49.  AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (Concepcion), 563 U.S. 333, 345–46 (2011) 
(citation omitted) (“[O]ur cases place it beyond dispute that the FAA was designed to promote 
arbitration. They have repeatedly described the Act as embo[dying] [a] national policy favoring 
arbitration . . . and a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any 
state substantive or procedural policies to the contrary.”). See also Southland Corp. v. Keating, 
465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984) (“In creating a substantive rule applicable in state as well as federal courts, 
Congress intended to foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of 
arbitration agreements.”). 
 50.  Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 341–42. The Court noted that “nothing in [the saving clause] 
suggests an intent to preserve state-law rules that stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of 
the FAA’s objectives.” Id. at 343. 
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the streamlined proceedings available when parties design their own 
arbitration processes.51 In fact, it found that “[r]equiring the 
availability of class-wide arbitration interferes with fundamental 
attributes of arbitration . . . creat[ing] a scheme inconsistent with the 
FAA.”52 Citing earlier precedent, the Court also noted that permitting 
class-wide arbitration when a contract is silent on the issue is 
inconsistent with the FAA because of the various formal procedures 
that such actions require.53 Further, the Court included several 
concerns it had over the compatibility of arbitration and class-wide 
proceedings.54 
C. The Board’s Decision in D.R. Horton 
In D.R. Horton, the Board reviewed a petition regarding 
individual-arbitration mandates in employment contracts.55 The 
employer-respondent argued that non-enforcement of this contract 
violated the FAA.56 As in the present case, the employee-petitioner 
argued that enforcing the arbitration agreement violates the 
protection of the substantive right of collective action, as provided in 
the NLRA.57 When two federal statutes present this type of conflict, 
the reviewer is required to try to accommodate them.58 Unless there 
exists a “clearly express congressional intention to the contrary,” the 
two statutes must be construed to co-exist with each other.59 
The Board found that arbitration is a satisfactory substitute for a 
judicial forum only if a litigant can effectively vindicate his rights.60 
Additionally, the FAA’s saving clause permitted it and the NLRA to 
co-exist, as it provides for the invalidation of any arbitration 
agreement that is otherwise revocable upon grounds in law or 
equity.61 Accordingly, finding that the NLRA grants a substantive 
 
 51.  See id. at 344–45 (requiring, for instance, that arbitration be individual). 
 52.  Id. at 344. 
 53.  Id. at 347–48 (citing Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 681–
82 (2010)). 
 54.  See id. at 349–51 (opining that class-wide arbitration lacks the informality and low cost, 
and increases risk to the defendants). 
 55.  In re D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, at 2277, 2012 WL 36274 (Jan. 3, 2012). 
 56.  Id. at 2284. 
 57.  Id.  
 58.  Id. (citing Southern S.S. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 316 U.S. 31, 47 (1942)). 
 59.  Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974) (“[W]hen two statutes are capable of co-
existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the 
contrary, to regard each as effective.”). 
 60.  D.R. Horton, 357 N.L.R.B. at 2285. 
 61.  Id. at 2286–87. 
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right to collective action, the Board held that individual-arbitration 
agreements violate the NLRA by mandating that employees waive 
their rights to seek relief from employment-related claims collectively 
in all forums.62 This type of interference by an employer in the 
engagement of concerted activity exempts those agreements from the 
FAA’s enforcement requirement.63 
The Fifth Circuit reviewed the Board’s decision in D.R. Horton 
and overturned it, holding that the NLRA does not fall within the 
saving clause, or override the FAA with any congressional command, 
or grant a substantive right to class action procedures.64 In Murphy 
Oil, the Board followed its own precedent, holding that the arbitration 
agreements signed by Hobson and her colleagues violated the 
NLRA.65 Upon review, the Fifth Circuit followed its ruling in D.R. 
Horton, again rejecting the Board’s conclusions.66 
III. HOLDING 
In Murphy Oil, the Fifth Circuit held that Murphy Oil did not 
commit an unfair labor practice by mandating that employees waive 
their NLRA-granted rights to seek class or collective action claims in 
all forums, relying on its reasoning in D.R. Horton.67 The D.R. Horton 
court found that the Board’s rejection of that case’s arbitration 
agreement did not reflect the proper weight of the FAA.68 While the 
Board held that the “NLRA invalidates any bar to class arbitrations,” 
the court explained that “the use of class action procedures . . . is not a 
substantive right,” but a procedural one.69 The court stated that the 
Board wrongly put the policy considerations of the NLRA ahead of 
those in the FAA by finding the statutes compatible, given two 
exceptions to the congressional mandate of arbitral enforcement: (1) 
 
 62.  Id. at 2288. 
 63.  Id. at 2281. 
 64.  Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 808 F.3d 1013, 1016 (5th Cir. 2015) (“[A]n 
employer does not engage in unfair labor practices by maintaining and enforcing an arbitration 
agreement prohibiting employee class or collective actions and requiring employment-related 
claims to be resolved through individual arbitration.”).  
 65.  Id. at 1017. 
 66.  Id. at 1017–18. 
 67.  Id. at 1017–21. The Fifth Circuit also held that if an arbitration agreement is 
reasonably construed to prohibit a filing of unfair labor practice charges with the Board, than it 
violates the NLRA. Id. at 1019. However, one that expressly affirms an employee’s right to file 
an unfair labor practices claim with the Board does not. Id.  
 68.  D.R. Horton, Inc., v. N.L.R.B., 737 F.3d 344, 348 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 69.  Id. at 357. 
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the saving clause, and (2) the finding of another statute’s contrary 
congressional command.70 
The court found that the saving clause could not be a basis for 
prohibiting class action waivers because that reasoning would 
completely undermine the purposes of the FAA.71 Specifically, 
“[r]equiring a class mechanism” impedes the benefits of arbitration by 
formalizing and slowing what otherwise would be a thorough, 
individualized, and less costly process to adjudicate claims.72 Allowing 
an option for class action in employment contracts would discourage 
employers from using individual arbitration at all.73 
Furthermore, the court did not find a contrary congressional 
command to override the FAA in the NLRA.74 Deferring significantly 
to the federal policy favoring arbitration,75 the court did not recognize 
any such mandate in the NLRA, especially because the statute does 
not explicitly provide for the right or procedures associated with this 
type of collective action.76 Similarly, the court did not find that the 
NLRA’s legislative history demonstrated Congress’s intent to 
override the FAA.77 Finally, it found no inherent conflict between the 
two statutes, as case law and Board practice have consistently shown 
that arbitration agreements in employment contracts were lawful and 
compatible with the NLRA.78 
Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the arbitration 
agreement must be enforced because the Board failed to show either 
that the NLRA granted a substantive right, that the NLRA fell within 
the saving clause, or that the NLRA presented a sufficient contrary 
congressional command to override the policy concerns behind the 
 
 70.  Id. at 358 (noting that “[t]he Board clearly relied on the FAA’s saving clause. Less 
clear is whether the Board also asserted that a contrary congressional command is present”). 
 71.  Id. at 359–60. 
 72.  Id. at 360. 
 73.  Id. at 359. 
 74.  Id. at 360 (“[T]here is no basis on which to find that the text of the NLRA supports a 
congressional command to override the FAA.”). 
 75.  Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (citing Moses H. 
Come Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp. 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)) (“[I]t should be kept in 
mind that ‘questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal 
policy favoring arbitration.’”). 
 76.  D.R. Horton, 737 F.3d at 360 (noting that the NLRA’s text, “mutual aid or protection,” 
did not implicate either express or strongly implied congressional intent, reasoning that other 
cases presented more convincing arguments and were still subsequently rejected as lacking a 
sufficient overriding congressional command). 
 77.  Id. at 361. 
 78.  See id. 
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FAA.79 Following the same line of reasoning, the Murphy Oil court 
held that the arbitration agreement at issue was enforceable, and 
accordingly overturned the Board’s decision.80 
IV. ARGUMENTS 
A. Petitioners’ Argument 
Petitioners argue that collective action waivers, like the one at 
issue here, deprive employees of the opportunity to choose how to 
initiate or participate in a dispute against an employer.81 The waiver 
prevents them from acting concertedly for the mutual aid or 
protection of each other, which the NLRA grants as a right.82 Because 
the initial claim concerned a FLSA violation, it falls within the 
NLRA’s jurisdiction.83 Petitioners assert that an employees’ right to 
pursue legal claims as a class is substantive and reflects a fundamental 
right to freely associate.84 The Board does not dispute that violations 
of the FLSA may be heard in an arbitral forum in some cases,85 but it 
protests any requirement imposed upon an employee to resolve work-
related legal disputes on an individual basis.86 
Furthermore, according to Petitioners, it is consistent with the 
policies motivating the NLRA to read § 158(a)(1) as prohibitive of 
waivers of § 157 rights.87 The NLRA was, in part, passed to address the 
 
 79.  Id. at 362. 
 80.  See Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 808 F.3d 1013, 1018 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 81.  See generally Brief for Petitioner, supra note 33. Hobson also submitted a brief on 
behalf of the N.L.R.B., but it will not be considered here. This summary of Petitioners’ 
arguments is not exhaustive. Rather, it is an overview of the most salient points. See id. at 8. 
Petitioners argue that prospective waivers of § 157 rights “deprive employees of the opportunity 
to decide, when a dispute arises, whether to proceed alone or to initiate or join a concerted 
response.” Id. Furthermore, individual waivers prevent individual employees from engaging in 
concerted activities “one by one.” Id. 
 82.  Id. at 11–12.  
 83.  See id. at 31–32 (“[T]he NLRA and the FLSA establish separate rights and 
protections, which coexist and apply simultaneously to all employees who qualify for protection 
under both statutes. Because the NLRA applies at the time an arbitration agreement is signed, 
it invalidates and prohibits any prospective waiver of protected concerted activity, including one 
barring concerted proceedings under FLSA Section 216(b).”). 
 84.  See id. at 11–12 (asserting that “Congress enacted the NLRA to protect employees’ 
‘full freedom of association’ to join together to advance their interests as employees . . . Section 
157 implements the core objectives of the NLRA by guaranteeing” protection of activities 
related to self-organization and “other concerted activities”). 
 85.  See id. at 9 (acknowledging that despite their “hostility towards arbitration . . . the 
Board recognizes [it] as an effective forum for vindicating federal laws”).  
 86.  Id. 
 87.  See id. at 22–24. Petitioners briefly describe the court’s history aligning with the 
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power imbalance between employees and their employers.88 Because 
the NLRA enables employees to pursue claims against employers 
who would otherwise be able to capitalize on the power imbalance by 
committing unfair labor practices, it follows that a waiver that 
breaches this safeguard is not permissible.89 By limiting an employee’s 
access to collective action rights under the NLRA, an employer 
infringes upon an interest that is closely associated with the freedom 
to associate.90 
Additionally, Petitioners argue that the class action waivers are 
unenforceable under the FAA’s saving clause.91 In addressing the 
Fifth Circuit’s contention that Concepcion rejects this assertion, 
Petitioners explain that Congress included the FAA saving clause to 
permit the restriction of arbitration where the agreement is invalid.92 
Therefore, because the agreement here violates a coequal federal 
statute, and not a state law like in Concepcion, it must be invalid.93 
Petitioners also addressed the apparent inconsistency between their 
position and the holding in Concepcion,94 which viewed a rule 
mandating the option for class-wide arbitration as incompatible with 
the FAA.95 Petitioners respond that preserving the option for 
employees to engage in collective action in some forum does not 
impede the equally valued option to individual arbitration.96 They rely 
upon Eastex Inc. to assert that a forum, either judicial or arbitral, must 
be available to employees to settle grievances as a group.97 This 
interpretation properly leaves the choice with employees, and 
 
employer’s interests in mitigating the labor unions’ power. Id. at 23–24. In the 1930s, Congress 
sought to protect employees’ interests by restricting federal courts’ jurisdiction to grant labor 
injunctions and expanding federal labor protections through the NLRA. Id. at 22–23. 
Petitioners argue that the Court has already supported a reading of § 158(a) strongly linked to § 
157 rights because contracts that restricted § 157 rights were a “continuing means of thwarting 
the policy of the [NLRA].” Id. at 24 (citation and internal quotations omitted).  
 88.  29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012). 
 89.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 33, at 22–24. 
 90.  Id. at 7. 
 91.  Id. at 35–46.  
 92.  Id. at 41. 
 93.  Id.   
 94.  Id. at 39–44.  
 95.  AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (Concepcion), 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011). 
 96.  See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 33, at 42 (asserting that an employer may still be 
able to “insist that any arbitral proceedings be conducted on an individual basis, provided it 
leaves open a judicial forum for collective action”). 
 97.  Id. at 7. See also Eastex, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 437 U.S. 556, 565 (1978) (rejecting the view 
that “employees lose their protection under the ‘mutual aid or protection’ clause when they 
seek to improve terms and conditions of employment or otherwise improve their lot as 
employees through channels outside the immediate employee-employer relationship”). 
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prevents the violation of an explicit prohibition provided in a coequal 
federal statute, and comports with the saving clause.98 Relatedly, 
Petitioners also reject the Fifth Circuit’s contention that prohibiting 
these class action waivers defeats the purpose of the FAA, which is to 
put arbitration agreements “on equal footing.”99 Rather, Petitioners 
argue that invoking the saving clause here permits the FAA and 
NLRA to both be effectuated, and recognizes the statutory 
exemptions the FAA has put in place for certain types of contracts.100 
Furthermore, Petitioners assert that the long tradition of cases 
failing to satisfy the high threshold for the FAA’s second exception, 
the contrary congressional command, is not pertinent here because no 
other case has involved a direct violation of another federal statute.101 
Petitioners contend that the NLRA’s underlying policies support the 
finding of a contrary congressional command that overrides that of 
the FAA. In any case, Petitioners assert that “[a] valid agreement is a 
threshold requirement for enforcement under § 2 of the FAA . . . [t]he 
congressional-command test pre-supposes the existence of an 
enforceable contract to arbitrate.”102 Because the agreement is illegal, 
according to Petitioners, the Board’s decision in Hobson’s case must 
be enforced.103 Ruling otherwise, they argue, would allow for the 
contractual nullification of rights provided by any federal statute that 
does not demonstrate a contrary congressional command.104 
B. Respondents’ Argument 
Respondents argue that collective action waivers at issue here are 
valid arbitration agreements, and so must be enforced per the FAA.105 
Respondents contend that the FAA and NLRA should be interpreted 
harmoniously, given the NLRA’s failure to satisfy either of the two 
exceptions to the FAA.106 Specifically, the statute does not fall within 
 
 98.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 33, at 10. 
 99.  Id. at 44. 
 100.  Id. at 44–45.  
 101.  Id. at 47–51. 
 102.  Id. at 47–48. 
 103.  See id. at 50–52.  
 104.  Id. at 51. See also id. at 55 (“[N]othing in the FAA so much as suggests that Congress 
intended, in affirming the legitimacy of arbitration agreements as legally binding contracts, to 
authorize private parties’ use of such agreements to evade their federal statutory obligations.”).  
 105.  See generally Brief for Respondent, supra note 4. This summary of Respondents’ 
arguments is not exhaustive. Rather, it is an overview of their most salient points. 
 106.  See id. at 39 (“Because the tools of statutory construction all point in the same 
direction, the meaning of the NLRA is unambiguous: Section 7 does not confer a right to 
‘engage in concerted activities’ by litigating as a class. At a minimum, there is no ‘clearly 
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the saving clause of the FAA.107 Also, they argue that no sufficient 
contrary congressional command exists to override the command of 
the FAA.108 Respondents further assert that the NLRA does not 
unambiguously refer to class proceedings or have jurisdiction over 
arbitration agreements, like the one at issue here.109 Finally, they argue 
that if the Court does not find the FAA and NLRA compatible, the 
Court must favor the FAA.110 
To deconstruct Petitioners’ argument that the saving clause must 
be invoked because of the NLRA, Respondents present four reasons 
that Petitioners’ interpretation is faulty.111 First, Respondents contend 
that the saving clause only applies to “inferior” laws, and not to other 
federal statutes.112 Because a coequal statute, like a federal one, does 
not need to be saved to have effect, the saving clause may not apply.113 
Second, the NLRA does not extend to “any” contract, as referred to 
in the saving clause, but only ones between employer and employee. 
This means that traditional contract defenses, like duress or illegality, 
do not apply because the clause’s phrasing excludes defenses 
available by another statute, like those in the NLRA.114 Third, in 
promoting the policy underscoring the FAA, Respondents argue that 
the saving clause may not apply for any reason that discriminates 
against arbitration or its defining features,115 as such an application 
would undermine the FAA’s purpose and interfere with the 
“fundamental attributes” of arbitration.116 So, prohibiting class 
waivers in arbitration agreements would undercut the FAA’s 
 
expressed congressional intention’ that it does.”) (citation and internal quotations omitted) 
(emphasis in original).  
 107.  Id. at 29. 
 108.  Id. at 14. 
 109.  Id. at 31. 
 110.  Id. at 54–57. 
 111.  Id. at 20–29. 
 112.  Id. at 20.  
 113.  Id. (citing N.L.R.B. v. Alt. Entm’t, Inc., No. 16-1385, 2017 WL 2297620, at *18 (6th Cir. 
May 26, 2017) (Sutton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
 114.  See id. at 21–24 (citing Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 3–4 (1984) (finding “a 
party may assert general contract defenses such as fraud to avoid enforcement of an arbitration 
agreement . . . [but] the defense to arbitration found in the [state statute at issue] is not a ground 
that exists at law or in equity ‘for the revocation of any contract’ . . . . [R]ather it was, ‘merely a 
ground that exists for the revocation of arbitration provisions in contracts subject to [the state 
statute at issue]’”)); id. at 21.  
 115.  Id. at 24 (quoting Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421, 1423 
(2017)).  
 116.  Id. at 24–27 (citing AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (Concepcion), 563 U.S. 333, 
344 (2011)).  
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facilitation of efficient procedures tailored to the specific action at 
hand.117 Finally, citing a concurring opinion in Concepcion, 
Respondents suggest that the saving clause addresses the proper 
formation of a contract,118 and as such, it would not be a ground to 
prohibit class waivers under the NLRA, because the clause focuses on 
revocation, and not nonenforcement.119 
Respondents also argue that the NLRA does not contain any 
clearly expressed contrary congressional intention that overrides the 
interests of the FAA.120 They support this contention with a series of 
cases in which courts have favored enforcing the FAA over other 
statutes that have challenged it.121 They argue that “the pattern in 
these cases is undeniable . . . the FAA unambiguously ‘mandate[d] 
enforcement’ of the arbitration agreement at issue.”122 Respondents 
support this assertion by pointing out that the only decision in which 
the Supreme Court was unable to reconcile another statute with the 
FAA, was eventually overruled.123 Additionally, when displacing the 
FAA in other statutes, Congress has spoken with much more 
specificity than it has in the NLRA, which does not mention the 
waiver of class proceedings or arbitration at all.124 Moreover, 
prohibiting class waivers, while addressing a peripheral NLRA 
concern, would undermine the very core of the FAA’s protections.125 
Respondents also discuss the text, legislative history, and underlying 
purposes of the NLRA, concluding that nothing in these sources 
 
 117.  Id. at 25 (quoting Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 344). 
 118.  Id. at 28–29 (citing Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 357) (Thomas, J., concurring) (considering 
the history preceding the enactment of the FAA, contending that a 1923 New York court “tied 
the concept of revocability to the ‘time of the [agreement’s] making’ – suggesting that the saving 
clause’s concern was limited to whether the agreement was properly made. When Congress 
enacted the FAA two year later, it was presumably aware of that authoritiative interpretation fo 
the statute it was copying.”) (citations omitted).   
 119.  Id. at 27–29 (citing Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 354) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Because 
the NLRA does not relate to contract formation, it is not a ground ‘for the revocation’ of a 
contract within the meaning of the saving clause.”). 
 120.  Id. at 14 (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974)). 
 121.  See, e.g., Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987) (the 
Court harmonized the FAA’s mandate to enforce arbitration agreements with the Exchange 
Act and RICO); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23–24 (1991) (the Court 
found no contrary congressional command in CROA to override FAA’s mandate); Vimar 
Seguro y Reasuguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 534–35 (1995) (the Court held that 
the COGSA should be construed to avoid conflict with FAA’s mandate). 
 122.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 4, at 17 (citation omitted).  
 123.  Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. 
Shearon/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 479–85 (1985).  
 124.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 4, at 54–57. 
 125.  Id. at 56. 
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suggests that Congress intended for the NLRA to override the 
FAA.126 
Finally, Respondents examine the NLRA’s text to argue that 
reading “concerted activities” as including class proceedings would 
improperly impose an obligation on employers or third parties to 
treat employees as a class, which is a procedural measure.127 It is not, 
as Petitioners argue, a measure to prevent substantive interference by 
employers.128 Additionally, Respondents argue that Congress did not 
view class proceedings as necessary to effectuate the right to engage 
in concerted activities.129 Asserting that outcomes of legal actions do 
not depend on whether claims are brought individually or as a class, 
Respondents dismiss the notion that waiving the option for class 
action in both judicial and arbitral forums would deprive an employee 
of any potential relief.130 It follows, then, that class action waivers do 
not violate the NLRA.131 Regardless of any violation, however, 
Respondents contend that the FAA’s command must be favored over 
that of the NLRA because the former is more specific, and the Court 
has only overridden the FAA when specific language has instructed it 
to do so.132 They add that the “enforceability of class waivers forms 
the core of the FAA.”133 Therefore, the FAA’s command must be 
favored over that of the NLRA.134 
V. ANALYSIS 
The Fifth Circuit erred in ruling in favor of Respondents. The issue 
before the Supreme Court, whether collective action waivers are 
permissible in employment arbitration agreements, connects to a 
broader question of how employees may freely associate with each 
other to affect change in the workplace or seek relief for the wrongs 
of their employers.135 The question is not merely procedural,136 and 
 
 126.  Id. at 51–54. 
 127.  Id. at 35–38. 
 128.  See id. at 35. 
 129.  Id. at 43. 
 130.  Id. at 43–44. 
 131.  Id. at 44. 
 132.  Id. at 54–57. 
 133.  Id. at 56. 
 134.  Id. at 57.  
 135.  See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 5, at 2, 24–25.  
 136.  See Brief for Respondent, supra note 4, at 47. Respondents argued that the right to 
participate in class proceedings “is a procedural right only ancillary to the litigation of 
substantive claims.” Id. 
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substantive rights must not be eviscerated through dismantling 
longstanding statutes, or picking and choosing some clauses while 
disregarding others.137 The NLRA protects employees’ right to engage 
in “concerted activities” for their “mutual aid or protection.”138 
Therefore, holding that waivers of collective action in all forums in 
employment contracts violate the rights granted in the NLRA is the 
proper conclusion. To address the countervailing interest presented by 
the FAA, the Court should invoke its main exception, the saving 
clause, to preserve the equal strength of the competing statutes. But, if 
the Court does not find that the saving clause applies, it should favor 
the underlying policies of the NLRA, as the interests in the people’s 
rights outweighs a general concern for informality and economy. 
The saving clause of the FAA provides that an arbitration 
agreement is legal and must be enforced, “save upon such grounds as 
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”139 The 
saving clause is included in the FAA to ensure that no illegal 
arbitration agreement will be enforced, which maintains the integrity 
of the arbitral forum. Nothing in the FAA or its jurisprudence 
suggests that Congress intended for illegal agreements to be enforced 
under the statute.140 Therefore, as Petitioners assert, because the class 
action waivers in this case violate a right in the NLRA, it is imperative 
to determine how the saving clause might be implicated here. 
As Respondents contend, the saving clause is meant only to cover 
generally applicable contract defenses, and not defenses unique to 
certain statutes.141 However, Respondents misconstrue Petitioners’ 
 
 137.  This analysis will not address Respondents’ textual arguments, except to say: the 
ability to bring a claim, in any forum, as a group, to seek relief for a work-related dispute falls 
within these bounds. Despite the fact that the NLRA does not mention arbitration explicitly, it 
also does not mention bringing a claim in any legal forum, judicial or otherwise, except in its 
discussion of bringing a charge to the Board’s attention. It would be absurd to understand this 
construction to be forgoing employees’ rights to bring a claim in a court of law. It is similarly 
nonsensical to assume that it did not apply to arbitration, either. Therefore, Respondents’ 
argument that the NLRA is ambiguous to the extent that it does not expressly refer to “class 
proceedings” or arbitration does not hold water, given that the ability for one or more 
employees to initiate a class action on behalf of the group for an employment dispute falling 
within the purview of the NLRA. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012). There is no mention of class 
proceedings in relation to concerted activities. Eastex, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 437 U.S. 556, 565–66 
(1978) (explaining that “it has been held that the ‘mutual aid or protection’ clause protects 
employees from retaliation by their employers when they seek to improve working conditions 
through resort to administrative and judicial forums.”). 
 138.  29 U.S.C. § 157. 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24–26 (1991).  
 141.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 4, at 26–27 (citing AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
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argument, because Petitioners do not attempt to invoke a defense that 
is provided for in the NLRA. Rather, they cite illegality as the 
applicable contract defense. To determine whether an agreement must 
be enforced under the FAA, the Court must consider the legality of a 
contract as a threshold matter.142 Requiring that individual arbitration 
be the only recourse for an employee who seeks to bring a work-
related dispute against her employer violates that employee’s right to 
collective action. Petitioners argue that if the arbitral forum were left 
available to the employee to pursue a class action, then waiving the 
right to a judicial forum would not be problematic under the 
NLRA.143 Therefore, because neither forum is available in the 
agreement here, the agreement violates the NLRA and thereby is an 
illegal contract. So, because illegality is an applicable contract defense 
to enforcement, it follows that arbitration agreements containing class 
action waivers in all forums are unenforceable because they are illegal 
under the NLRA.144 
Furthermore, Respondents’ reliance on Concepcion in claiming 
that the saving clause may not be invoked is misplaced. Unlike the 
cautionary tales described in Concepcion, the NLRA-granted right 
that the agreement here violated does not derive its “meaning from 
the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue,” or discriminate 
against arbitration alone.145 The NLRA also does not disfavor 
contracts that “have the defining features of arbitration 
agreements.”146 Again, Petitioners do not deny that arbitration can be 
a sufficient means of adjudication.147 Rather, they argue that 
mandating individual arbitration as the only available legal recourse 
for an employee disregards the underlying policy concerns of the 
 
Concepcion (Concepcion), 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011)) (internal quotations omitted).  
 142.  See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (stating that “an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration 
an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, 
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon the grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract”); Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421, 1426 
(2017), (holding that “The FAA cares not only about the ‘enforce[ment]’ of arbitration 
agreements, but also about their initial ‘valid[ity]’—that is, about what it takes to enter into 
them” when analyzing § 2). 
 143.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 33, at 1–2. 
 144.  See Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Mullins, 455 U.S. 72, 83–84 (1982) (quoting Hurd v. Hodge, 
334 U.S. 24, 34-35, 68 S. Ct. 847, 853, 92 L.Ed. 1187 (1948) (footnotes omitted)). The Court 
asserts that courts must refrain from enforcing contracts that would violate “restrictions and 
limitations of the public policy of the United States” established in federal statutes. Id. (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 145.  Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 333.  
 146.  Kindred Nursing Ctrs., 137 S. Ct. at 1426. 
 147.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 33, at 9. 
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NLRA.148 The supposed virtues of arbitration, including its 
informality and low cost, are not foregone just because the 
proceedings are brought by a group of employees.149 In fact, allowing 
for one group to bring a common claim or set of commons claims is 
more efficient than a separate proceeding for each individual’s 
claim(s). The integrity of the arbitral forum is not undermined by 
allowing claims to be brought by a group.150 Finally, the Supreme 
Court has consistently indicated that the saving clause addresses the 
revocability, validity, and enforceability of arbitration agreements, 
which undermine Respondents’ contention that the clause only 
applies to the formation of contracts.151 
To hold arbitration in a higher regard than the workers’ rights to 
work for their mutual aid or protection also violates the equal 
treatment principle, which demands that arbitration is given the same 
effect as judicial proceedings.152 Ensuring that an employee has a 
choice to participate collectively does not mean that individual action 
is extinguished, or that the arbitral forum becomes less forceful. The 
FAA was enacted to preserve equal treatment for arbitration and the 
judicial forum. It was not enacted to subvert employees’ rights. 
Therefore, prioritizing the FAA over the NLRA to this extent is as 
inconsistent with the equal footing principle as completely 
disregarding arbitration in favor of the protections of the NLRA. For 
the foregoing reasons, the saving clause should be invoked to maintain 
the equal might of the FAA and the NLRA, and preserve the 
legitimacy of the arbitral forum. 
Based on the precedent discussed in Respondents’ argument, it is 
difficult to determine whether the Court will find a contrary 
congressional command “specific” enough within the NLRA to 
override the FAA. But, because they are coequal statutes, it would 
appear that weighing their countervailing underlying policies is a 
 
 148.  Id. at 11. 
 149.  Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 350–52. 
 150.  See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 33, at 9 (“Section 2’s saving clause preserves the 
Board’s rule invalidating agreements that require employees to individually arbitrate work-
related claims. That rule is not based on hostility towards arbitration, which the Board 
recognizes as an effective forum for vindicating federal laws. It is based on longstanding labor-
law principles developed without reference to arbitration, which implement the NLRA’s 
express bar on employer interference with employees’ right to act together for mutual 
protection. The rule is entirely neutral with respect to the forum.”). 
 151.  See, e.g. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991). But see 
Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 354 (Thomas, J., concurring).  
 152.  See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974).  
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useful exercise to determine which might be a better course. The FAA 
protects the procedure and integrity of arbitration agreements.153 It 
was enacted to provide legitimacy to an alternative to court 
proceedings that is efficient, informal, and economic.154 Arbitration 
reduces the burden on courts and provides litigants with a speedier 
road to recovery.155 These are valuable goals and the federal policy 
and case law clearly demonstrate a tradition favoring arbitration in 
pursuit of those goals. The NLRA, however, protects people. In an 
employee-employer relationship more power rests with the employer, 
especially if the employee must face the employer alone. This is why, 
by way of the NLRA, Congress sought to ensure that individuals may 
gather with each other to seek relief for common disputes.156 
Inhibiting individuals from the opportunity to engage in this form of 
justice-seeking measures skirts around the NLRA itself and offends 
its mission.157 
Respondents have not shown that the FAA has ever preempted a 
directly on point federal law.158 On this question before the Court, in 
which the FAA is up against an equally powerful federal statute that 
directly protects an interest at risk in this arbitration agreement, the 
Court must consider why Congress was concerned about the 
employee-employer relationship. In determining how those policy 
concerns outweigh the economy provided by the FAA, the Court 
 
 153.  See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 339. While courts must place arbitration agreements on 
equal footing with other contracts, they will not enforce them “upon such grounds as exist at law 
or in equity for the revocation of any contract” according to the saving clause. Id. 
 154.  Id. at 350–52. See also Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 58 (1974) 
(asserting that “it is the informality of abitral procedure that enables it to function as an 
efficient, inexpensive, and expeditious means for dispute resolution”). 
 155.  See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 58.  
 156.  See Eastex, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 437 U.S. 556, 565–66 (1978) (holding that within § 7, the 
74th Congress established its intention to protect concerted activities from employer retaliation 
when employees sought to improve working conditions). 
 157.  See id.; 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012) (“The inequality of bargaining power between 
employees who do not possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and 
employers who are organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership association 
substantially burdens and affects the flow of commerce . . . [E]xperience has proved that 
protection by law of the right of employees to organize and bargain collectively safeguards 
commerce from injury, impairment, or interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by 
removing certain recognized sources of industrial strife and unrest, by encouraging practices 
fundamental to the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of differences as to 
wages, hours, or other working conditions, and by restoring equality of bargaining power 
between employers and employees.”). 
 158.  See, e.g., Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 352 (holding that the FAA preempted California’s 
judicial rule on the unconscionability of class arbitration waivers in consumer contracts); 
Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421, 1429 (2017) (holding that Kentucky’s 
clear statement rule violates the FAA’s mandate). 
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must be mindful that ruling in favor of Respondents enables 
employers to mandate that employees bring actions alone. This result 
would eviscerate the NLRA, leaving it toothless to protect 
institutionally vulnerable people. 
CONCLUSION 
In its review of Murphy Oil v. N.L.R.B., the Supreme Court must 
reckon with complex and somewhat conflicting statutory law, case law, 
and policy concerns. A victory for the employers risks foreclosing any 
opportunity for effective claim relief for employees across countless 
industries and sectors. Due to this catastrophic result, the Supreme 
Court should preserve the fundamental mission of the NLRA, and 
decide that seeking justice collectively outweighs a slightly faster 
process. 
 
